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1Secrecy Outage Performance of Full-Duplex
Spectrum Sharing Networks with Different Antenna
Reception Schemes
Tao Zhang, Student Member, IEEE, Yueming Cai, Senior Member, IEEE, Yuzhen Huang, Member, IEEE, Trung
Q. Duong, Senior Member, IEEE, and Weiwei Yang, Member, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the secrecy performance
of full-duplex multi-antenna spectrum-sharing wiretap networks,
in which a jamming signal is simultaneously transmitted by the
full-duplex secondary receiver (Bob) based on the zero forcing
beamforming (ZFB) algorithm. For the security enhancement,
we propose the two antenna reception schemes, i.e., (i) random
selection combining (RSC) where Bob selects LB antennas at
random to combine the received signals, and (ii) generalized
selection combining (GSC) where Bob selects LB strongest
antennas to combine the received signals. We derive the exact
closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage probability of full-
duplex multi-antenna spectrum-sharing wiretap networks with
ZFB algorithm. In order to explore a new design of the proposed
schemes, we provide tractable asymptotic approximations for the
secrecy outage probability in high signal-to-noise ratio regime
under two distinct scenarios. From the analysis, we demonstrate
that a) when the main channel is much better than the eavesdrop-
per’s channel, GSC/ZFB scheme achieves full diversity NB while
RSC/ZFB scheme only achieves partial diversity LB, b) GSC/ZFB
scheme achieves better secrecy performance than RSC/ZFB with
different antenna numbers at Bob.
Index Terms—Cognitive radio networks, multiple antennas,
secrecy outage probability, full duplex.
I. INTRODUCTION
RECENTLY, as an effective solution to alleviate thespectrum shortage problem, cognitive radio has drawn
considerable attention from the research community [1]–[4].
In spectrum sharing cognitive radio networks, secondary users
(SUs) are allowed to access the licensed spectrum by us-
ing underlay, overlay or interweave methods as long as the
interference on the primary user (PU) does not exceed a
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given threshold. Among them, underlay is easy to realize, thus
extensive research efforts have been devoted to investigating
the cognitive underlay networks with different scenarios, for
example, multiple antennas systems [5], relaying systems [6]
and multiple-users systems [7].
Nowadays, wireless communication has become an indis-
pensable technique to improve the living standard. Meanwhile,
the open and dynamic features of wireless networks have
raised concerns regarding the security of the information trans-
mission. As is known to all, the traditional way to ensure the
security of data transmission is through various cryptographic
schemes in the upper layers. However, with the development
of the computation techniques, the traditional cryptographic
schemes can be deciphered at vicious nodes. To cope with this
problem, as a supplemental approach to encryption, physical
layer security has been proposed as a promising solution to
improve the security of wireless communications [8], includ-
ing the secure transmission in cognitive radio networks [9].
However, in cognitive radio networks, the radio frequencies
licensed at the PU are shared with SUs, which leads to an
increased possibility of the confidential information being
eavesdropped from both PU and SUs [10], [11]. Motivated
by this, several works have investigated the security issues of
cognitive radio networks from the physical layer perspective.
In [12], the authors designed the selection combining (SC)
scheme in cognitive radio networks with secondary receiver
being equipped with multiple antennas. The authors in [13]
analyzed the secrecy performance of cognitive radio networks
with maximal ratio combining (MRC) scheme at secondary
receiver and transmit antenna selection (TAS) scheme at sec-
ondary transmitter, and presented an exact closed-form expres-
sion for the achievable secrecy rate of the considered system.
In [14], generalized selection combining (GSC) scheme was
proposed to enhance the security of cognitive radio networks,
which offers a performance/implementation tradeoff between
SC scheme in [12] and MRC scheme in [13].
In order to further improve the security of information
transmission, the cooperative jamming techniques were first
proposed in a pioneer work [15]. By designing a special
interference signal from other nodes, the difference between
the quality of main channel and eavesdropper’s channel is
enlarged, which can be utilized to improve the secrecy rate
[17], [24]. However, the cooperative jamming scheme depends
on helper mobility, trustworthiness and synchronization, which
makes it difficult to implement. To efficiently solve these
2issues and exploit the advantages of jamming techniques, a
novel jamming scheme based on the full-duplex technique was
designed in [18]–[20], where the legitimate receiver (Bob)
can receive the signal from the source (Alice) and transmit
jamming signals to illegitimate receiver (Eve) simultaneously.
More importantly, compared with the cooperative jamming
scheme that uses external helpers, the jamming scheme based
on a full-duplex Bob is more easier and reliable to implement.
Later, the results in [21] demonstrated that the system using
the jamming from full-duplex Bob scheme can achieve a
better secrecy performance than the system with a half-
duplex Bob. Moreover, with the ability of sending jamming
from a full-duplex Bob, the authors proposed a cooperative
secrecy transmission scheme and proved its optimality in the
sense of achieving the maximal secure degrees of freedom
in [22]. However, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, the
application of full-duplex operation in multi-antenna cognitive
radio networks with underlay scheme to improve the secrecy
performance has not been well understood.
Motivated by the above discussion, we utilize the spatial
diversity into the security enhancement by considering a
multi-antenna cognitive radio network, where a secondary
transmitter (Alice) communicates with a secondary destina-
tion (Bob) equipped with multiple antennas in the presence
of a primary receiver (PR) and an eavesdropper (Eve). To
improve the secrecy performance of the considered network,
our aim is to determine the antenna allocation scheme at
Bob for reception or for transmission. Specifically, we design
two novel secure transmission schemes of multi-antenna full-
duplex spectrum-sharing wiretap networks with zero forcing
beamforming (ZFB) algorithm, i.e., random selection com-
bining/ZFB scheme and generalized selection combining/ZFB
(GSC/ZFB) scheme, respectively. The main contributions of
our work are summarized as follows.
 Based on the proposed analytical model, we first derive
the closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage prob-
ability of multi-antenna spectrum-sharing wiretap net-
works with two different secrecy transmission schemes,
i.e., RSC/ZFB and GSC/ZFB. The derived analytical
expressions provide efficient means to evaluate the impact
of key system parameters, i.e, the number of antennas and
the interference threshold on the secrecy performance of
cognitive wiretap networks.
 To achieve additional insights on the application of two
proposed schemes into the practical design, we present
the asymptotic closed-form expressions for the secrecy
outage probability and obtain the secrecy diversity order
and secrecy coding gain under two distinct scenarios, i.e.,
Scenario I: Bob is located close to Alice, and Scenario II:
Bob and Eve are both located close to Alice. In particular,
we show that, in these two scenarios, the considered
system with the proposed schemes achieves different
secrecy diversity order and coding gain, respectively.
 Our results demonstrate that GSC/ZFB scheme tends
to outperform RSC/ZFB scheme since GSC/ZFB can
achieve a more secure degree of freedom of NB, while
RSC/ZFB only achieves a secure degree of freedom of
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Fig. 1. System model.
LB. Moreover, we find that RSC/ZFB achieves a similar
performance to that of GSC/ZFB as LB approaches NB,
and the secrecy performance of both schemes is not
always improved with the increase of LB under a given
NB. Finally, the optimal antenna allocation at Bob for
the two proposed schemes is also analyzed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system
model is introduced in Section II. Section III formulates the
problem and presents the analytical expressions of the secrecy
outage probability. In Section IV, we provide a high signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) analysis for the secrecy outage probability,
and Section V presents the numerical results and discussions.
Finally, Section VI concludes the key findings for the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a multi-antenna cognitive wiretap system as
shown in Fig. 1, which consists of a secondary transmitter
(Alice), a full-duplex secondary receiver (Bob), an eavesdrop-
per (Eve) and a primary receiver (PR). Similar to [12], [23],
we assume that Bob is equipped with NB antennas and other
nodes are equipped with a single antenna. Without loss of gen-
erality, the following assumptions are adopted throughout this
paper: 1) Both main and eavesdropper’s channels experience
quasi-static independent and non-identical Rayleigh fading, 2)
The primary transmitter is far away from Bob and Eve as in
[7], [12], thus the interference from the primary transmitter can
be ignored at Bob and Eve, and 3) Similar to [22], [24]–[31],
the channel state information (CSI) between Eve and Bob link
is known at Bob1, while the CSI of Alice to Eve link is not
available at Alice.
To exploit the advantages of multiple antennas and full-
duplex techniques, we design two new secure transmission
schemes in this paper, in which LB antennas at Bob are allo-
cated for reception, and the remaining (NB LB) antennas are
1This can be achieved in practical scenarios where Eve is another active user
in the system, e.g., in a time division multiple-access (TDMA) environment.
In this scenario, the Eve plays dual roles as legitimate ones for transmitting
and eavesdroppers for receiving confidential information [22], [32], such that
Bob can estimate the eavesdropper’s channel during Eve’s transmissions.
3used to send a weighted jamming signal to degrade the quality
of service at Eve. Among different jamming algorithms, we
choose ZFB algorithm due to the lower computational load of
implementation. In addition, the weight vector wZF based on
ZFB algorithm can be designed as
max
wZF
hyBEwZF
s:t:
hyBPwZF = 0 kwZFkF = 1; (1)
where y is the conjugate transpose operator and kkF denotes
the Frobenius norm, hBE denotes the (NB   LB)1 channel
vector between the remaining (NB   LB) antennas at Bob
and the Eve with entries following identical and independently
distributed Rayleigh fading with parameter BE / d BE, where
dBE is the distance between Bob and Eve and  is the path loss
factor. In addition, hBP represents the (NB   LB)1 channel
vector between the remaining (NB   LB) antennas at Bob
and the PR with entries following identical and independently
distributed Rayleigh fading with parameter BP / d BP, where
dBP is the distance between Bob and PR. Moreover, hBP can
be obtained through a spectrum-band manager [33]. Now, with
the help of [34, Theorems 4.21, 4.22] and [35, Lemma 1], the
optimal weight vector is given by
wZF =
T?hBE
kT?hBEk ; (2)
where T? =
 
I  hBP
 
hyBPhBP
 1
hyBP

is the projection
idempotent matrix with rank (NB   LB   1).
Given LB reception antennas at Bob, we now propose
the two different combining reception schemes. In the first
scheme, i.e., RSC/ZFB, Bob selects LB antennas at random
to combine the received signals and simultaneously utilizes the
remaining (NB LB) antennas to send a weighted jamming to
degrade the quality of eavesdropper’s channel. In the second
scheme, i.e., GSC/ZFB, Bob first selects LB strongest antennas
based on the CSI of the main channel to combine the received
signals, and uses the remaining (NB   LB) antennas to send
the jamming to degrade the quality of eavesdropper’s channel.
As a result, the instantaneous SNR of the main channel with
RSC/ZFB scheme is given by2
B1 =
LBX
i=1
PS
2B

jhABi j2

; (3)
where 2B is the noise variance at Bob, jhABi j2 is the chan-
nel gain between Alice and the i-th antenna at Bob with
E
h
jhABi j2
i
= AB / d AB, where dAB is the distance
between Alice and Bob. In the context of spectrum sharing
networks, transmission of secondary node cannot cause a
harmful interference on the primary network. As such, the
transmit power PS = min

Q
jhAPj2 ; Pt

, where Q and Pt
2Please note that, for the full-duplex mechanism, we assume that the self-
interference can be completely suppressed at Bob. As that in [18], [20], [22],
[36]–[39], this assumption is widely used to study the information-theory
oriented performance, i.e., capacity and outage probability. Although full
cancelation of self-interference cannot be achieved with the help of state-
of-the-art techniques in [40].
denote the interference temperature constraint at PR and the
maximum transmit power constraint at Alice, respectively,
jhAPj2 is the channel gain between Alice and PR with
E
h
jhAPj2
i
= AP / d AP, where dAP is the distance between
Alice and PR.
Similarly, the instantaneous SNR of the main channel with
GSC/ZFB scheme can be computed as
B2 =
LBX
j=1
PS
2B
hAB(j)2; (4)
where
hAB(j) 2 is the channel gain between Alice and the j-
th strongest antenna at Bob particularly for GSC/ZFB scheme
and we arrange
nhAB(j) 2; 1  j  NBo in descending order
as
hAB(1)2  hAB(2)2      hAB(NB) 2.
In addition, for the proposed two schemes, the instantaneous
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of the eaves-
dropper’s channel can be expressed as
E =
PS jhAEj2
PZ
hyBEwZF2 + 2E ; (5)
where 2E is the noise variance at Eve, jhAEj2 is the channel
gain between Alice and Eve with E
h
jhAEj2
i
= AE / d AE,
where dAE is the distance between Alice and Eve.
Now, according to [41], the achievable secrecy rate of the
full-duplex multi-antenna spectrum-sharing wiretap network is
given by
CS =

log2 (1 + Bi)  log2 (1 + E) ; Bi > E
0; Bi  E (6)
where i 2 f1; 2g represents RSC/ZFB scheme and GSC/ZFB
scheme, respectively.
To make the following analysis more tractable, we first
define  = QPt , B =
Pt
2B
AB =
Q
2B
AB, E = Pt2E
AE =
Q
2E
AE, and Z = PZ2E
BE.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we investigate the secrecy outage per-
formance of the full-duplex multi-antenna spectrum-sharing
wiretap networks with the proposed two schemes. From the
definition of secrecy outage probability, it can be mathemati-
cally represented as [42]
Pout (Rs) = Pr (CS < Rs)
=
Z 1
0
FBi
 
2Rs (1 + x)  1fE (x) dx: (7)
where Rs is a given transmission rate, FBi () is the cumu-
lative distribution function (CDF) of Bi , and fE () is the
probability density function (PDF) of E.
We next present a detailed analysis for the secrecy outage
probability of full-duplex multi-antenna spectrum sharing net-
works with RSC/ZFB and GSC/ZFB schemes.
4A. RSC/ZFB scheme
Since both B1 and E contain the common random variable
(RV), G = jhAPj2, the traditional means to analyze the secrecy
outage performance are not applicable due to the statistical
dependence. In order to tackle this problem, the condition-
and-average approach is adopted in our analysis. With this
in mind, we first present the CDF of B1 and PDF of E
conditioned on G in the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1. The CDF of B1 conditioned on the RV G is given
by
FB1 (xjG) = 1  e
  
2
Bx
PSAB
LB 1X
k=0
1
k!

2Bx
PSAB
k
: (8)
Proof: According to (3) and with the help of [43],
the desired result can be easily derived after some simple
manipulations.
Lemma 2. The PDF of E conditioned on the RV G is given
by
fE (yjG) =
2E
PSAE

AEPS
PZBEy + AEPS
NB LB 1
 exp

  
2
Ey
PSAE

+ exp

  
2
Ey
PSAE

 (NB   LB   1)PZBE(PSAE)
NB LB 1
(PZBEy + PSAE)
NB LB : (9)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Armed with (8) and (9), we now provide the secrecy outage
probability of RSC/ZFB scheme in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The secrecy outage probability of full-
duplex multi-antenna spectrum-sharing wiretap networks us-
ing RSC/ZBF scheme can be derived as
Pout;1 (Rs) = 1 
(
LB 1X
k=0
1
k!
kX
a=0

k
a
 
2Rs   1k a 2Rsa

"
(E)
a
(B)
k
(Z)
a+1
	

a+1; 3+LB+a NB; B + 2
RsE
BZ

  (a+ 1) + (NB   LB   1) (E)
a
(B)
k
(Z)
a
  (a+ 1)
	

a+ 1; 2 + LB + a NB; B + 2
RsE
BZ



1  exp

  
AP

exp

 2
Rs   1
B

+
" 
2Rs   1AP + B
BAP
#a k 1
 
AP
 
 
k   a+ 1;
 
2Rs   1AP + B
BAP
!)
: (10)
where   () is the Gamma function [46, Eq. (8.310.1)] and
  (; ) is the upper incomplete Gamma function [46, Eq.
(8.350.2)].
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 1: According to Theorem 1, we find that although
the interference from Bob to Eve is high when LB = 1, the
secrecy performance of the considered system is poor due to
the legal link from Alice to Bob is weak. On the other hand,
when LB is large, i.e., (NB 2), the secrecy performance of the
considered system is also poor due to the interference at Eve
is weak. Hence, there exists an optimal LB to minimize the
secrecy outage probability of the considered system. Actually,
it can be modeled as
LB = argmin
LB
Pout;1 (LB)
s:t: 1  LB  NB   2
(11)
Please note, obtaining a closed-form expression of LB
directly from (11) is intractable. As an alternative, it can be
solved numerically as in [44].
B. GSC/ZFB scheme
Similar to RSC/ZFB scheme, B2 and E are statistically
dependent due to the common RV G. As such, we first obtain
the conditional CDF of B2 in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. The conditional CDF of B2 can be derived as
FB2 (xjG) =

NB
LB
X
S
LBX
k=0
lkx
k


2B
PSAB
k
exp

  
2
Bkx
PSAB

; (12)
where S =
n
(n0; n1) j
1P
j=0
nj = NB   LB
o
, and lk is given
by
lk =
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
(NB LB)!( 1)n1
1Q
j=0
nj !

n1
LB
+ 1
 1
; k = 0
(NB LB)!( 1)n1
1Q
j=0
nj !

1+2  1 sgn(n1)(k 1)!
 1
; 1  k  LB   1
(NB LB)!( 1)n1
1Q
j=0
nj !

3+4  1 sgn(n1)(k 1)!
 1
; k = LB
(13)
with 1, 2, 3, and 4 as
1 =   sgn (n1)
(k   1)!

n1
LB
+ 1
 1
; (14)
2 =
( 1)1 k2sgn (n1)
(k   1)!

n1
LB
+ 1
 1
n1
LB
k2 1
; (15)
3 =  sgn (n1)

n1
LB
+ 1
 (1 k+LB)
; (16)
4 =sgn (n1)
LB 1X
l=1
( 1)l+1

LB   k + l   1
l   1



n1
LB
 (LB k+l)
; (17)
5where k and k are expressed as
k =
8<: 0; k = 0k   1; 1  k  LB   1
k   sgn(n1) (LB   1)  1; k = LB
(18)
k =
8<:
0; k = 0
1; 1  k  LB   1
LB+n1
LB
; k = LB
(19)
Proof: The proof can be found in [45, Theorem 1].
Now, for GSC/ZFB scheme, we have the following key
result.
Theorem 2. The secrecy outage probability of full-
duplex multi-antenna spectrum-sharing wiretap networks us-
ing GSC/ZBF scheme is given by
Pout;2 (Rs)=

NB
LB
X
S
LBX
k=0
lk
kX
m=0

k
m
 
2Rs 1k m 2Rsm
(B)
k
   (m+1)

1
Z
	

m+1; 3+LB+m NB; B+Ek2
Rs
BZ

+ (NB LB 1) 	

m+1; 2+LB+m NB; B+Ek2
Rs
BZ

 (E)
m
(Z)
m
(
1  exp

  
AP

exp
 
 k
 
2Rs   1
B
!
+

AP
"
k
 
2Rs   1AP + B
BAP
# k+m 1
  
 
k  m+ 1;
k
 
2Rs   1AP + B
BAP
!)
; (20)
where 	(; ; ) is the confluent hypergeometric function of the
second kind [46, Eq. (9.211.4)].
Proof: See Appendix C.
Remark 2: Similar to RSC/ZFB scheme, there is an optimal
LB for GSC/ZFB scheme, which can be numerically achieved.
IV. HIGH SNR ANALYSIS
Although the exact secrecy outage probability expressions
obtained in Theorems 1 and 2 allow us to evaluate the secrecy
performance of the two proposed schemes, their intractability
cannot reveal any additional insights on the effect of networks
parameters. Thus, in this section, we turn our attention to
analyze the asymptotic secrecy outage probability in high SNR
regimes. Specifically, two distinct scenarios are considered:
1) B ! 1 and fixed E, that is a scenario where Bob is
located close to Alice while the eavesdropper’s channel is
severely blocked due to heavy shadowing and 2) B ! 1
and E ! 1, that is a scenario where Bob and Eve
are both located close to Alice, i.e., the main channel and
eavesdropper’s channel have a similar quality.
A. Scenario I: B !1 and fixed E
1) RSC/ZFB Scheme:
Corollary 1. The secrecy outage probability of full-
duplex multi-antenna spectrum-sharing wiretap networks with
RSC/ZFB scheme under B !1 and fixed E is approximat-
ed as
Pout;1 (Rs)  1 LBB ; (21)
where 1 is given by
1 =
1
(LB)!
LBX
i=0

LB
i
 
2Rs   1LB i 2Rsi  (i+ 1)

"
(E)
i
(Z)
i+1
	

i+ 1; 3 + LB + i NB; 1
Z

+

E
Z
i
(NB   LB   1)	

i+1; 2+LB+i NB; 1
Z


"
1  exp

  
AP

+
LBAP
LB
 

LB + 1;

AP
#
: (22)
Proof: See Appendix D.
2) GSC/ZFB Scheme:
Corollary 2. The secrecy outage probability of full-
duplex multi-antenna spectrum-sharing wiretap networks with
GSC/ZFB under B !1 and fixed E is approximated as
Pout;2 (Rs)  2 NBB ; (23)
where 2 is given by
2 =

NB
LB

(NB   LB)!
(LB)
NB LB (NB)!
NBX
i=0

NB
i
 
2Rs   1NB i
  2Rsi  (i+ 1)" (E)i
(Z)
i+1
	

i+ 1; 3 + LB + i NB; 1
Z

+

E
Z
i
(NB   LB   1) 	

i+ 1; 2 + LB + i NB; 1
Z


"
1  exp

  
AP

+
NBAP
NB
 

NB + 1;

AP
#
: (24)
Proof: When B ! 1, the approximated conditional
CDF of B2 is given by
FB2 (xjG) 

NB
LB

(NB   LB)!
(LB)
NB LB (NB)!

x
B
NB
: (25)
Then, following similar procedure as in the proof of Corol-
lary 1, the desired result can be obtained.
Remark 3: From the above results, we find that RSC/ZFB
and GSC/ZFB schemes achieve different secrecy diversity,
i.e., LB and NB under Scenario I. Specifically, they are
independent of the parameters of primary networks and the
eavesdropper’s channel. However, the parameters of the eaves-
dropper’s channel and primary networks degrade the secrecy
performance of the considered system through the secrecy
coding gain, i.e.,
G1 = 1 
1
LB ; (26)
6and
G2 = 2 
1
NB : (27)
It is worth noting from the above Remark, the secrecy
diversity order and coding gain of RSC/ZFB scheme are
similar to GSC/ZFB scheme when LB approaches NB. That is
to say, RSC/ZFB scheme will achieve a similar performance
to that of GSC/ZFB scheme as LB approaches NB.
B. Scenario II: B !1 and E !1
Now, we focus on analyzing the approximated secrecy out-
age probability of full-duplex multi-antenna spectrum-sharing
wiretap networks under Scenario II.
1) RSC/ZFB Scheme:
Corollary 3. The secrecy outage probability of full-
duplex multi-antenna spectrum-sharing wiretap networks with
RSC/ZFB scheme under B !1 and E !1 is given by
Pout;1 (Rs)  1 
LB 1X
k=0
 
2Rs
k
k!

E
BZ
k
  (k + 1)


1
Z
	

k + 1; 3 + k + LB  NB; B + 2
RsE
ZB

+(NB LB 1)	

k+1; 2+k+LB NB; B + 2
RsE
ZB

:
(28)
Proof: See Appendix E.
2) GSC/ZFB Scheme:
Corollary 4. The secrecy outage probability of full-
duplex multi-antenna spectrum-sharing wiretap networks with
GSC/ZFB scheme under B !1 and E !1 is given by
Pout;2 (Rs) 

NB
LB
X
S
LBX
k=0
lk
 
2Rs
k
  (k + 1)


	

k + 1; 3 + k + LB  NB; k2
RsE + B
BZ



E
BZ
k 1
Z
+

E
BZ
k
(NB   LB   1)
	

k + 1; 2 + k + LB  NB; k2
RsE + B
BZ

: (29)
Proof: Following similar procedure as in the proof of
Corollary 3, the above result can be easily obtained.
Remark 4: Compared with the analysis in Scenario I, we
find that there exists a secrecy outage floor for both schemes
under B !1 and E !1, which indicates that the secrecy
diversity of the considered system reduces to zero in this
scenario.
C. Comparison of the Proposed Schemes
Now, in this section, we provide a comprehensive com-
parison between RSC/ZFB scheme and GSC/ZFB scheme.
As discussed in the above, LB receive antennas are ran-
domly selected without any comparison among NB antennas
in RSC/ZFB scheme. While in GSC/ZFB scheme, the LB
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Fig. 2. Secrecy outage probability vs number of antennas for RSC/ZFB
scheme, where the interference threshold Q = 10dB.
strongest receive antennas at Bob are selected from NB
antennas after comparison. In addition, the proposed two
schemes utilize the remaining (NB LB) antennas to send the
weighted jamming signal to improve the secrecy performance
of the considered system. Motivated by these observations, the
differences between RSC/ZFB scheme and GSC/ZFB scheme
are summarized in Table I.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, representative numerical results are provided
to evaluate the impacts of different system parameters, i.e., the
number of antennas, and different antenna reception schemes,
on the secrecy outage performance. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the SNR is Pt
2B
, the secrecy rate is Rs = 2,
and the noise variance is 2B = 
2
E = 1. In addition, the
distance between two nodes is normalized to unit. As shown in
these figures, the Monte Carlo simulation results are in exact
agreement with the analytical ones, which corroborates the
accuracy of the analytical expressions.
Figs. 2 and 3 illustrate the secrecy outage probability of
RSC/ZFB and GSC/ZFB schemes with different selection
number of antennas, LB, for a given NB, respectively. As
can be expected, we find that the secrecy outage probability
is improved by increasing LB, but it does not always improve
with the increment of LB, for example, LB = 6 in Fig. 2
and LB = 5 and 6 in Fig. 3. This is rather intuitive, since
increasing LB results in decreasing the number of antennas
that Bob can utilize to transmit jamming signals to confuse
Eve. In addition, the secrecy outage floor demonstrates the
accuracy of the analysis in (28) and (29), which reveals that
the secrecy outage floor appears and the achievable secrecy
diversity order reduces to zero under Scenario II.
Fig. 4 plots the secrecy outage probability versus SNR for
RSC/ZFB scheme and GSC/ZFB scheme when Bob is located
close to Alice. It is observed that, RSC/ZFB and GSC/ZFB
schemes achieve different secrecy diversity order of LB and
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Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probability vs number of antennas for GSC/ZFB
scheme, where the interference threshold Q = 10dB.
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Fig. 4. Exact and asymptotic secrecy outage probabilities for RSC/ZFB and
GSC/ZFB schemes, when  = 1 and E = 10dB, respectively.
NB under Scenario I, as indicated in (21) and (23), respective-
ly. Furthermore, we can see that GSC/ZFB scheme achieves
a better performance than RSC/ZFB scheme. In addition, for
GSC/ZFB scheme, the secrecy outage performance of LB = 3
outperforms that of LB = 5 due to the fact that the coding
gain under LB = 3 is higher.
Fig. 5 shows the secrecy outage probability of the con-
sidered system under different LB for both RSC/ZFB and
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Fig. 5. Secrecy outage probabilities of RSC/ZFB and GSC/ZFB schemes
for different number LB and NB when Pt = 20dB.
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Fig. 6. Secrecy outage probabilities of RSC/ZFB and GSC/ZFB schemes
for random LB and optimal LB when NB = 10 and interference threshold
Q = 10dB, respectively.
GSC/ZFB schemes when the number of antennas at Bob
NB = 8; 9; 10, respectively. As shown in the figure, we
can see that both the secrecy outage performance of the
considered system with RSC/ZFB and GSC/ZFB schemes
improves when the number of antennas at Bob NB increases.
In addition, GSC/ZFB scheme achieves better performance
than RSC/ZFB scheme. However, this performance gap is
narrowed when LB approaches NB. The main reason is that
when LB approaches NB, the proposed two schemes become
similar as demonstrated in Remark 3.
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF RSC/ZFB AND GSC/ZFB SCHEMES
RSC/ZFB GSC/ZFB
Cooperative jamming antennas NB   LB NB   LB
Antenna number NB, LB re-
quirements
NB  3, LB  NB   2 NB  3, LB  NB   2
Diversity order LB=0 NB=0
Coding gain G1 = 1 
1
LB G2 = 2 
1
NB
8Fig. 6 plots the secrecy outage probability of the system
under random LB and optimal LB for both RSC/ZFB and
GSC/ZFB schemes when NB = 10. With the help of Remark
1 and the simulation results in Fig. 5, we derive that optimal
LB = 6 for RSC/ZFB scheme and L

B = 5 for GSC/ZFB
scheme, respectively. As shown in the Fig. 6, we can see
that the secrecy performance will not always improve with
the increase of LB under a given NB.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we analyzed the secrecy performance of full-
duplex multi-antenna spectrum-sharing wiretap networks with
RSC/ZFB and GSC/ZFB transmission schemes, respectively.
Specifically, assuming the Rayleigh fading, exact closed-form
expressions for the secrecy outage probability of cognitive
wiretap channels with RSC/ZFB and GSC/ZFB schemes were
derived, which allows us to evaluate the secrecy performance.
Furthermore, we also provided simple asymptotic approxima-
tions for the secrecy outage probability under two distinct
scenarios and found that GSC/ZFB scheme achieves full
diversity NB, while RSC/ZFB scheme only achieves partial
diversity LB under Scenario I. Finally, the optimal antenna
allocation at Bob was investigated, and the simulation results
demonstrated that the optimal antenna allocation achieves
better secrecy performance than random antenna allocation for
both schemes.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
In order to derive the conditional PDF of E, we first define
the RV XE = PS jhAEj2=2E and give the PDF of the RV
Z1 = PZ
hyBEwZF2=2E as [35]
fZ1 (z) =
zNB LB 2 exp

  2EzPZBE

(NB   LB   2)!

2E
PZBE
NB LB 1
:
(30)
Then, the conditional CDF of E can be expressed as
FE (yjG) =
Z 1
0
FXE (y (z + 1) jG)fZ1 (z) dz
= 1  exp

  
2
Ey
PSAE

PSAE
PZBEy + PSAE
NB LB 1
:
(31)
To this end, the conditional PDF of E can be obtained by
taking a simple derivative.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
With the help of (7), we first derive the conditioned secrecy
outage probability as (32) at the top of the next page, where

1 and 
2 can be derived with some simple mathematical
manipulations as

1 =
kX
a=0

k
a
 
2Rs   1k a 2Rsa 2B
PSAB
k


2E
PSAE
 a
2E
PZBE
a+1
  (a+ 1)
	

a+ 1; 3 + LB + a NB; B + 2
RsE
BZ

; (33)
and

2 =
kX
a=0

k
a
 
2Rs   1k a 2Rsa (NB   LB   1)


2B
PSAB
k
2E
PSAE
 a
2E
PZBE
a
  (a+ 1)
	

a+ 1; 2 + LB + a NB; B + 2
RsE
BZ

: (34)
Then, the unconditioned secrecy outage probability can be
derived as
Pout;1 (Rs) =Z 1
0
"
1 
LB 1X
k=0
1
k!
exp
 
 
2
B
 
2Rs 1
PSAB
!
(
1+
2)
#
fG (g) dg:
(35)
To this end, substituting the PDF of G into (35) and per-
forming some simple mathematical manipulations, the desired
secrecy outage probability of RSC/ZFB in (10) is obtained.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Similar to (32), we derive the conditioned secrecy outage
probability as (36) at the middle of the next page. Then, after
performing some simple mathematical manipulations, 1 and
2 can be derived as
1 =

2E
PSAE
 m
2E
PZBE
m+1
  (m+ 1)
	

m+ 1; 3 + LB +m NB; B + Ek2
Rs
BZ

(37)
and
2 =
(PSAE)
m
(PZBE)
m (NB   LB   1)   (m+ 1)
	

m+ 1; 2 + LB +m NB; B + Ek2
Rs
BZ

: (38)
Finally, substituting (37) and (38) into (36) and performing
some simple mathematical manipulations, the desired secrecy
outage probability of GSC/ZFB in (20) is obtained.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
When B ! 1, the conditional CDF of B1 can be
approximated as
FB1 (xjG) 
1
LB!

2Bx
PSAB
LB
: (39)
9Pout;1 (RsjG) =
Z 1
0
FB1
 
2Rs (1 + y)  1jG fE (yjG) dy = 1  LB 1X
k=0
1
k!
exp
 
 
2
B
 
2Rs   1
PSAB
!

266664
Z 1
0
 
2B
 
2Rs (1 + y)  1
PSAB
!k 2E exp PSAB=2B+2RsPSAE=2EPSAE=2EPSAB=2B y
PSAE

PSAE
PZBEy + PSAE
NB LB 1
dy| {z }

1
+
Z 1
0
 
2B
 
2Rs (1+y) 1
PSAB
!k exp PSAB=2B+2RsPSAE=2E
PSAE=2EPSAB=
2
B
y

(NB LB 1)PZBE(PSAE)NB LB 1
(PZBEy + PSAE)
NB LB dy| {z }

2
377775 ; (32)
Pout;2 (RsjG) =
Z 1
0
FB2
 
2Rs (1 + y)  1jG fE (yjG) dy
=

NB
LB
X
S
LBX
k=0
lk
exp

 k(2
Rs 1)
PSAB=2B

(PSAB=2B)
k
kX
m=0

k
m
 
2Rs   1k m 2Rsm

26664
Z 1
0
ym
2E exp

 2Bk2RsyPSAB

PSAE
exp

  
2
Ey
PSAE

PSAE
PZBEy + PSAE
NB LB 1
dy| {z }
1
+
Z 1
0
ym exp

 
2
Bk2
Rsy
PSAB

exp

  
2
Ey
PSAE

(NB   LB   1)PZBE(PSAE)NB LB 1
(PZBEy + PSAE)
NB LB dy| {z }
2
37775 : (36)
Also, the conditional PDF of E can be written as
fE (yjG) =
1
E
exp

  y
E

E
Zy + E
NB LB 1
+ exp

  y
E

(NB   LB   1) Z(E)NB LB 1
(Zy + E)
NB LB : (40)
Substituting (39) and (40) into (32) and applying the bino-
mial expansion, the asymptotic secrecy outage probability of
RSC/ZFB scheme conditioned on the RV G is given by
Pout;1 (RSjG)
Z 1
0
FB1
 
2Rs(1+y) 1jGfE (yjG)dy
=
1
LB!
LBX
i=0
 
2Rs   1LB i 2Rsi 2B
PSAB
LB
 (E)
i
(Z)
i+1
  (i+ 1)	

i+ 1; 3 + i+ LB  NB; 1
Z

+
1
LB!
LBX
i=0
 
2Rs   1LB i 2Rsi 2B
PSAB
LB


E
Z
i
  (i+ 1)	

i+ 1; 2 + i+ LB  NB; 1
Z

:
(41)
Now, averaging over G and with the help of equality [46,
Eq.(3.381.4)], the desired result can be derived.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF COROLLARY 3
Based on (32), when B ! 1 and E ! 1, the
conditioned secrecy outage probability can be expanded as
(42) at the top of the next page, where 
3 and 
4 can be
easily derived as

3 
kX
v=0

k
v
 
2Rs   1k v 2Rsv (E)v
(B)
k
(Z)
v
Z
   (v+1)	

v+1; 3+v+LB NB; B + 2
RsE
ZB

; (43)
and

4
kX
v=0

k
v
 
2Rs 1k v 2Rsv (NB LB 1) (E)v
(B)
k
(Z)
v
   (v+1)	

v+1; 2+v+LB NB; B + 2
RsE
ZB

: (44)
Finally, substituting (43) and (44) into (42) yields the final
result.
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Pout;1 (RsjG)  1 
LB 1X
k=0
1
k!

266664
Z 1
0
 
2B
 
2Rs (1 + y)  1
PSAB
!k 2E exp PSAB=2B+2RsPSAE=2EPSAE=2EPSAB=2B y
PSAE

PSAE
PZBEy + PSAE
NB LB 1
dy| {z }

3
+
Z 1
0
 
2B
 
2Rs (1+y) 1
PSAB
!k exp PSAB=2B+2RsPSAE=2E
PSAE=2EPSAB=
2
B
y

(NB LB 1)PZBE(PSAE)NB LB 1
(PZBEy + PSAE)
NB LB dy| {z }

4
377775 ; (42)
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